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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I. UNLAWFUL DETAINER WAS NOT A COMMON LAW ACTION
Unlawful Detainer is a Statutory Action and therefore in
bringing it, reference must be made to the statutory
authorization or the action becomes a Common Law Writ of
Ejectment.

No reference was made to statutory authorization.

If

the action is found to be Unlawful Detainer, Plaintiff requested
other equitable reliefs beside restitution of the property,
thereby affecting the characterization as strictly Statutory
Unlawful Detainer Action with its ten day Appeal period, and
converting it into an equitable action with its

thirty day

Appeal Period.
POINT II. ALL INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE APPEAL WAS BEFORE
THE COURT.
The fact of the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Action was presented
to the Court by Ford's attorney in great detail.

The failure of

Salazar to emphasize the Bankruptcy stay does not preclude the
Appeal Court from ruling upon its effect, since all information
was before the lower court, and Defendants claimed their Appeal
was timely.
POINT III. BASED UPON FORD'S OWN INFORMATION SALAZAR'S APPEAL
WAS TIMELY.
Under the events as described by Ford, the Appeal was timely
filed and Salazar perfected his Appeal as soon as possible after
the Stay was lifted.

1

ARGUMENT

1.

UNLAWFUL DETAINER WAS NOT A COMMON LAW ACTION.

Ford claims that the action was clearly one based upon Unlawful
Detainer as defined in U.C.A. §78-36-3, but cannot show any place
in his Complaint that describes it as such, or refers to the code
section under which it is brought, or to Unlawful Detainer.
Under common law, there was no action of Unlawful Detainer.
If it were your property you could take it back, so long as your
methods were not exceptionally violent, (22 Am Jur 907).

The

general purpose for the Statutory Unlawful Detainer was to
provide a peaceable method of returning property over to the true
owner.

" The general purpose of the statues of forcible entry and

detainer, xxx...xxx in this country, is that regardless of the
actual condition of the title to, or the right of possession of,
the property, the party actually in peaceable and quiet
possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence, or
terror." emphasis added, (22 Am Jur 909)
To sustain an action in forcible entry or detainer in
absence of statutory modification, " the plaintiffs possession
and the forcible entry or detainer are ordinarily the sole
questions at issue.

To sustain these proceedings it is necessary

to prove only that the complainant was in actual and peaceable
possession of the premises, and that the defendant forcibly
entered and turned him out or deposed him by force after a
2

peaceable entry." 22 Am Jur 910, see Scott v. Hewitt 127 Tex 31
90 S.W. 2d 816
Under Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah# Inc., 558 P.2d
1317 (Ut. 1976),

the Supreme Court found that

Plaintiff's

failure to strictly comply with the provisions of section 78-36-8
converted his action for unlawful detainer into one at common law
for ejectment.

In the first count, Plaintiff sought to recover

possession of real estate, and in the second count sought to
quiet title to certain land adjoining the property involved in
first cause of action.

Therefore, the case was tried as an

action in equity and Plaintiff could not defeat the Appeal by
contending that the action was one of forcible detainer.

See

also, Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Co. 56 Utah 190, 188
P. 1117 (1920)
In the action at hand, Plaintiffs are not dealing with a
buyer of property.

They are dealing with a party who claims

title through a trust deed as Trustors of the Deed.

In this

situation, Ford has never been in possession of the land, neither
actual nor contractual.
While true, that Ford claimed an interest in the property in
its complaint, that interest was denied in Salazar's Answer,
therefore placing the burden of proving title on the Plaintiff,
and the Court in the position of having to determine title to the
real property which under §78-4-7 (1) (a) U.C.A., " The Circuit
Court shall have civil jurisdiction both law and equity xxx,
except: (a) in actions to determine the title to real property".
3

The Circuit Court did not have the jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the title.

The Court proceeded, over the objection

of the Defendants, to hear evidence on who held title and
evidence on Defendant's proffering and acceptance of partial
payment by Ford prior to the Trustee Sale. The Court
subsequently found that it did not believe Defendant Salazar's
testimony, and found for the Plaintiffs, and by so doing exceeded
its jurisdictional limits by determining where the title lay.
The statutory requirement of §78-36-2, UCA that the Court
found the tenant, by force, unlawfully held and kept possession
was neither alleged to in Plaintiff's Complaint nor found by the
Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or its
Judgment, and therefore we have what is an action in Common Law
Ejectment, or Common Law Restitution.
Under §78-36-8, "The Plaintiff in his Complaint in addition
to setting forth the facts upon on which he seeks to recover, may
set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which
may have accompanied the

Unlawful Detainer, and claim

damages therefore or compensation for the occupation of the
premises or both."
Plaintiff failed to claim Unlawful Detainer in his Complaint
and failed to allege the points contained in § 78-36-2(1) which
define Unlawful Detainer.

Furthermore the Court failed to find

any acts that made up Unlawful Detainer.

As we speak of Unlawful

Detainer, Common Law Ejectment or Restitution it is important for
all parties to know which procedure they are dealing with.
4

If an

action in Unlawful Detainer, there is a ten day Appeal period.
If an action in Unlawful Detainer and Equity, or an action in
Ejectment, Restitution or Equity there is a thirty day Appeal
period.
Plaintiffs brought an action claiming title and designating
how it received title to the property in question.

It further

claimed that Defendants refused to leave the premises upon
notice.

Plaintiffs went on to claim that they had a prospective

buyer for the property and might be damaged by Defendants' past
and future interference with the sale. The Plaintiffs then held
to themselves the right to amend the complaint if necessary if
they had a loss from the perceived interference.

Under the

Prayer, Plaintiffs requested such other relief as the Court
deemed proper thereby leaving room for damages caused by the lost
sale due to Defendants acts if so adjudged.

By so doing, if it

were not already an action in ejectment, it became an action in
equity by so broadening the requests, i.e. requesting (1) Writ of
Restitution, (2) damages for staying in the property, after
notice and (3) potential damages for loss of sell .
This action in reality was or became an action for
ejectment, i.e., to eject the Defendants from their property.

It

was based upon the fact that Plaintiff claimed its title to be
superior to Defendants; and

that its trustee sale was properly

held, and that the loan was in default.
Defendants denied Plaintiff's claims of title to the
property in its Complaint,

It denied that the Trustee Sale was
5

valid and that the loan was in default.

It laid claim to the

fact that fraud was perpetuated upon it by the Plaintiff and
therefore the Plaintiff had no right for the Prayers in his
action.

It further demanded that Plaintiff's Complaint be

dismissed.
At trial Defendants moved the Court for a dismissal or
removal to the District Court based upon the fact that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to try an action to determine title to real
property.
The Court found under its Findings of Fact that the
Defendants claims in equity were not sufficient but made no
determination as to the points that make up Unlawful Detainer.
Unlawful Detainer was neither alleged or proved.

Therefore, this

action comes under the thirty day Appeal period.
POINT II:

SALAZAR DID NOT WAIVE CLAIMS OF TOLLING BY FAILURE TO
ARGUE THAT MATTER BEFORE THE LOWER COURT,

Plaintiffs claimed the ten day period had passed before the
appeal was filed.

Defendants argued that it had not passed.

The

Court, along with both Defendants and Plaintiff's counsel
struggled with the proper deadline for the Appeal to be filed.
The issue before the Court was whether the Appeal was timely
after the Court had ruled it did not have jurisdiction,
Plaintiff's counsel described to the Court the difficulty it had
in evicting Defendants.

He discussed the fact of the Chapter 13

Bankruptcy and how he had to have the Stay lifted on an Ex Parte
basis.

The completed sequence of the timing was before the
6

Court.

The Court could have changed its jurisdictional position

if it had desired so to do, but did not. All facts were before
the Court.
The clear facts of the case are that Defendants could not
have filed the Appeal sooner without being in contempt of the
Bankruptcy Court.

Defendants received notice that the Stay had

been lifted at 7:00 p.m. on May 25, 1990 and on the next day,
their Appeal was filed.

Plaintiff in his brief has designated

May 21'st as the proper date by which the Appeal was to be filed,
but for on that date, the Bankruptcy stayed the tolling of Appeal
time.

After the release of Stay was filed with the Circuit

Court, Defendants perfected their Appeal on the very same day.
It could not have been filed any sooner after the Bankruptcy was
filed and the Stay released and therefore it was timely.

The

lower Court did have jurisdiction for processing the Appeal and
should have allowed the record to be transferred to the proper
Appeal Court.
The cases presented by Plaintiffs relative to whether the
Court had all the information before it are not in point.

In the

jury selection case (Salt Lake County vs. Carlston), 776 P.2d 653
(Ut. App. 1989) no objection had been raised as to the method of
jury selection at the time of trial, the issue on Appeal was not
before the Court.

In the case at hand, Defendants claimed the

Appeal was timely filed, and argued that issue.

The Court had

all the evidence before it on the issue of the Bankruptcy staying
the tolling of the Appeal time, but chose to continue with its
7

Judgment that the Appeal was not filed timely.
In the other cases, presented by Plaintiffs all are based
upon issues not raised at trial, i.e. hearsay objection not being
made, issue of contract amendment, issue of jury selection,
objection pertaining to the issue of failure to make a requested
voir dire inquiry, all of which are matters not before this
Court.
Once again the issue of timeliness was before the Court.
All the evidence was before the Court as to when filed, the
Bankruptcy filing, etc., but the Court still chose to continue
with it lack of jurisdiction based upon its decision that the
filing was untimely.

Logically, if Plaintiff's position were to

be held, only cases given at trial could be used on Appeal- which
of course is not the case.

POINT III. THE APPEAL WAS FILED WITHIN THE TEN DAY PERIOD
CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW.
On September 7, 1990, Plaintiffs mailed proposed copy of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment to
Defendants7 attorney.

On or about September 10, 1990, the

Judgment was signed, several days earlier than it should have
been - Rule 4-504(2) states that opposing counsel has 5 days
after service to object to form and contents. Copies of the
signed Judgment and Findings were mailed to Defendants on
September 11, 1990. The Plaintiff's attorney signed a Notice of
Entry of Judgment on September 13, 1991. Defendants filed

8

bankruptcy on September 21, 1990, The Stay was released on
September 25, and served on Defendants at their home on September
25, at 7:00 p.m.

The release of the Automatic Stay was filed

with the Circuit Court on September 26, 1990. The Appeal was
filed on September 26, 1990, during the day.
According to U.R.C.P., Rule 6(e), "Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings
within a prescribed period of after the service of notice or
other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him
by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period."
Under Rule 58(d) U.R.C.P., "The prevailing party shall
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of Judgment to all
other parties and shall file proof of service of such notice with
the Clerk of the Court" . This notice was signed on the 13th of
September, 1990 and mailed to Defendants, presumably on the 13th.
Adding the three days onto the 13th would make the Appeal due on
the 2 6th day of September, 1990, the day it was filed.
Even if the three day mailing is not allowed, with the
tolling of the time caused by the filing of the Bankruptcy, the
filing was still timely if the Court should find this was an
Unlawful Detainer Action.

Equity and justice dictates that the

Appeal was timely.

9

CONCLUSION
Clearly under several theories the Appeal was filed timely.
(1)

This was not an Unlawful Detainer Action but an Action

brought in Equity.

Since Unlawful Detainer is a statutory act,

to claim under it at least some reference must be made to it and
if title must be proved and other damages are to be determined,
then it becomes an action in ejectment or equity, and therefore a
thirty day Appeal period.
(2)

All facts were before the Court as to the staying of

the tolling of the Appeal time by the Bankruptcy filing.

The

Court failed to apply the law properly and so, was incorrect in
finding the Appeal was filed untimely.
(3)

The Plaintiff was careless in perfecting his Judgment.

The signed Judgment, etc., papers were not mailed until September
11, 1990.

The Notice of judgment was not signed until September

13, 1990 and mailed probably on the same day.

Adding on the

three days for receiving mail to the ten days would still make
the filing date the 26'th of September, 1990 and this does not
include the Stay of the tolling produced by the filing of the
Bankruptcy Action.

Therefore under this argument the Appeal was

timely.
WHEREFORE the Appeal Court should overrule the lower courts
dismissal and allow the Appeal to be transferred to the proper
Appeals Court for a hearing on the merit of the original Appeal.

10

78-4-7

JUDICIAL CODE

(b) If a governing body establishes a circuit court or returns to a justice
of the peace system, it shall cause the Office of the State Court Administrator to be notified in writing within 30 days after the fact.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 78-4-6, e n a c t e d b y L.
1977, c h . 77, § 1; 1987, ch. 228, § 3.
R e p e a l s a n d E n a c t m e n t s . — Laws 1977,
ch. 77, § 1 repealed former § 78-4-6 (L. 1951,
ch. 26, § 2(3); C. 1943, Supp., 104-4-3.12), repealing and separability clause, and enacted
present § 78-4-6, effective July 1, 1978.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 14, divided the former section into Subsections (l)(a), (1Kb), and (2); substituted "is created" for "will be created and
deemed to exist on the effective date of this
act" in the first sentence of Subsection (l)(a);
deleted "shall" preceding "succeed" and "office
o f preceding "city judge" and substituted
"have" for "shall exercise" in the second sentence of Subsection (l)(a); substituted "is
known" for "shall be known" in the second sentence of Subsection (1Kb); added Subsection
(l)(c); divided the former first sentence of Subsection (2) into the present first and second
sentences by deleting "and"; substituted "a

municipal judge of the peace may not" for "no
justice of the peace shall" in the present first
sentence of Subsection (2); substituted "are
successors" for "shall be the successors" and
"the" for "such" preceding "municipal departments" in the present second sentence of Subsection (2); and substituted "the" for "such"
preceding "election" and inserted "municipal"
preceding "justice" in the present third sentence of Subsection (2).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 228, designated the previously undesignated provisions of this section as last amended by Laws
1977, ch. 77, § 1; added present Subsection
(2)(b); and made minor changes in phraseology
and punctuation.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Justices' courts,
Chapter 5 of this title.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
S u c c e s s o r s to j u s t i c e s of p e a c e .
. .
—City j u d g e s .
The Legislature, by providing that city
judges shall be ex officio justices of the peace,
did not intend that city judges should hold the

office of justice of the peace. What was mtended was to annex the duties of justices
justice of
the peace to the office of the city judge. City of
Ogden City v. Patterson, 122 Utah 389, 250
P.2d 570 (1952)(decided under prior law).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

(2) The circuit
jeace courts wh
H i s t o r y : C. 1953
L977, ch. 77, § 1; L
;h. 121, § 1.
Repeals and Em
:h. 77, § 1 repealed
•h. 58, § 1; C. 1943, i
:ity court judges as s
seace, ana4 enacted j
July 1, 1978.
Amendment Not
ment rewrote Subse
The 1986 amendm
ing actions to foreclo

A:
Amount in controve
—Counterclaim.
City court.
District court.
—Sum claimed.
City court.
District court.
Extraterritorial juri;
—Property in anoth
False imprisonment
Title to real estate.
—Recovery of purer;
Waters and water i
—Upkeep of irrigat
A m o u n t in c o n t r o
—Counterclaim.

C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 291.
Key N u m b e r s . — Courts <s= 187.

78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions — Concurrent jurisdiction.
(1) The circuit court shall have civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all
matters if the sum claimed is less than $10,000, exclusive of court costs,
except:
(a) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding
actions to foreclose mechanics liens;
(b) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity;
(c) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code;
(d) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer;
(e) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs;
(f) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court.
122
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Rule 6

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) E n l a r g e m e n t When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made sifter the expiration of th?
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending
before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served a t some
other time.
(e) Additional time after s e r v i c e by mail. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 6, F.R.C.P.
Rule 73, cited near the end of Subdivision
(b), was repealed upon adoption of the Rules of
the Appellate Procedure.
Cross-References. — Amendment to pleadings to conform to evidence, time of motion for,
Rule 15(b).
Commencement of action, time of service,
Rule 4(b).
Corporation or association, mailing of process to, Rule 4(e)(5).

Depositions, objections to errors and irregularities, Rule 32(d).
Discharge of attachment or release of property, Rule 64C(f).
Documents for state or subdivision, filing
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3.
Election laws, Sundays included in computation of time, § 20-1-12.
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge,
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21.
Jury venire, service by mail, § 78-46-13.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 58A

The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment
and may advance it on the calendar.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 57, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah
2d 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments §§ 183, 186, 203 et seq.
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments
§§ 17, 18, 104, 155.
A.L.R. — Right to jury trial in action for

declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th
146.
Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment *»
41, 42, 251, 367.

Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment; The prevailingjMj£t£jhall
promrjt^^
JE$3g^r^
and"shal]UBie proof or service"ofsxicli notice witnftieTclerkof the court How'
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the
defendant, to the following effect:
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of January, 1992, I
mailed a true and correct copy, postage prepaid of the foregoing
to the following:

MIKEL M. BOLEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
3535 South 3200 West
West Valley City, Utah 84119

WESLEY F. SINE
Attorney for 'Defendant
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